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UTAH, THE HONORABLE DAVID SAM, JUDGE 
ROBERT M. ~kRAE, for 
DELAND & McRAE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
317 West 1st South 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN, for 
CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR & MOODY 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Appellants 
55 East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84601 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEHENT OF NATURE OF CASE. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON PETITION FOR REHEARING. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ARGUMENT . 
POINT I 
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
RULE THAT THE EVIDENCE REQUIRED A FINDING 
BY THE JURY THAT DEFENDANTS SATHER WERE 
ENTITLED TO BE PAID THE SUM OF $46,560.00, 








SUM OF $21,500.00. 8 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . 13 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Volume 2, Jones on Evidence, page 738, Fifth Edition . 13 
CASES CITED 
Brown vs. Pickard, 4 Utah 292; ll Pacific 512. 9 
Nelson vs. Watts, 563 P2d 798. 9 
Wilson vs. Blair, 211 Pacific 289; 65 Hontana 155. 13. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREHE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 





ROBERT R. SATHER and 
BONNIE LEE SATHER, 
Defendants, Appellants 
and Cross-Respondents. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 16017 
COME NOW the defendants and appellants and hereby 
petition the Supreme Court of Utah for a rehearing of the above 
cause in the particulars hereinafter noted upon the grounds 
and for t~e reasons contained herein and in support thereof, 
respectfully show: 
l. The appeal in this case was argued before this 
Court on October 10, 1979. 
2. On January 11, 1980, this Court filed its decision 
affirming the Special Verdict of the Jury as returned in the 
Court below, and in particular with reference to this Petition 
for Rehearing, affirming the Jury Verdict as to Point II raised 
in appellant's original Brief on Appeal, wherein the jury 
determined that plaintiff owed defendants the sum of $21~00.00 
instead of the sum of $46,560.00 as contended by the defendants. 
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3. The defendants seek a rehearing upon that point 
upon the following grounds: 
(a) The evidence does not support the Jury Verdict. 
(b) The jury and the Supreme Court have overlooked 
or ignored plaintiff's own admission that it 
owed at least $46,000.00 in connection with 
the land in question. 
For the foregoing reasons, it is urged that this 
Petition be granted. 
DATED this~~~ day of January, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ullen or 
CHRIST EN, TAYLOR & MOODY 
Attorneys for Defendant Sather 
55 East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84601 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATE~ffiNT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This Petition for Rehearing involves the interests 
of the parties in and to real property situate in Uintah 
County, State of Utah. Defendants SATHER claim reimbursement 
from the plaintiff for money advanced for plaintiff's benefit 
by defendants SATHER in connection with said land. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT AND ON APPEAL 
The case was tried to a jury upon special interroga-
tories. The jury found that plaintiff was the owner of the 
real property and was entitled to possession thereof upon its 
paying to the defendants SATHER, the sum of $21,500.00. This 
position was affirmed by the Supreme Court in its decision 
filed January 11, 1980. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Defendants seek a determination that the plaintiff 
owes defendants the sum of $46,560.00 for money advanced for 
plaintiff's benefit by the defendants. Defendants, in the 
alternative, seek a new trial on such issue. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants will restate the facts insofar as they 
pertain to the point raised on this Petition for Rehearing. 
On October 11, 1972, the plaintiff signed a note in 
favor of the FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH (Ex 22-P; Tr-29), 
which note was secured by a trust deed to the real property 
involved in this suit. This real property is referred to by 
the parties as the Moss Ranch. In a separate transaction, but 
also on October 11, 1972, plaintiff and the defendant 
ROBERT R. SATHER entered into an Agreement which in essence 
provided that since the defendants SATHER had guaranteed 
plaintiff's payment of said note to the FIRST SECURITY BANK, 
if plaintiff failed to pay such note according to its terms 
and the defendants were required to pay off that note by reason 
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of the said guarantee, defendant SATHER was to receive a 
Warranty Deed to the same property as that covered by the 
Trust Deed to the FIRST SECURITY BANK (Ex 22-P). The said 
Agreement was delivered to the FIRST SECURITY BANK in con-
junction with said Trust Deed (Tr-62). 
The note of October 11, 1972, was subsequently 
refinanced and additional money was loaned by the FIRST SECURITY 
BANK to the plaintiff on September 15, 1973. On that date, 
plaintiff signed another Trust Deed Note in the sum of $50,000.00 
in favor of the FIRST SECURITY BANK (Ex 24-P; Tr-98), $20,000.00 
of which constituted a renewal of the earlier note and $30,000.00 
of which was a new loan (Ex 23-P; Tr-31). The new note was 
likewise secured by a Trust Deed dated September 15, 1973, 
covering the Moss Ranch upon which the FIRST SECURITY BANK was 
designated as beneficiary (Ex 37-D; Tr-67,68). The $30,000.00 
of new money was credited to the account of the plaintiff at 
FIRST SECURITY BANK, Roosevelt, Utah (Tr-67). Also, on 
September 15, 1973, plaintiff and defendant ROBERT R. SATHER 
entered into an Agreement similar to their earlier arrangement, 
which Agreement provided that in consideration of the defendant's 
guarantee of payment, should the plaintiff default in timely 
payment to the FIRST SECURITY BANK, and should the defendants 
pay off the note pursuant to their guarantee, the FIRST SECURITY 
BANK was to deliver the Warranty Deed of October 11, 1972, to 
defendant SATHER (Ex 3-P; Tr-24). The original of this second 
Agreement between plaintiff and defendant ROBERT R. SATHER was 
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concurrently delivered to the FIRST SECURITY BANK with the 
Trust Deed and Note signed by the plaintiff (Tr-24). 
In furtherance of the said Agreement, the defendants 
SATHER on September 21, 1973, executed and delivered to the 
FIRST SECURITY BANK a guaranty document in favor of the FIRST 
SECURITY BANK, whereby the defendants agreed to absolutely 
guarantee payment of all sums the plaintiff then owed or should 
ever owe to the FIRST SECURITY BANK. This guaranty was for an 
unlimited amount (Ex 42-D; Tr-31). 
On September 25, 1973, plaintiff issued its check 
payable to defendant ROBERT R. SATHER for the sum of $25,000.00, 
which check was drawn on the Roosevelt, Utah office of the FIRST 
SECURITY BANK (Ex 31-P). Plaintiff contended at the trial that 
this money was a loan to enable defendant SATHER to buy diamonds 
and to cover some overdraft checks (Tr-64-66). Defendant SATHER 
contended that the money was given to him by plaintiff toward 
repayment of prior debts owed to the defendant SATHER by the 
plaintiff and plaintiff's president, PETE BUFFO (Tr-257,258; 
Ex 60-D; Tr-106). 
On September 25, 1973, defendant SATHER, using said 
check given him by the plaintiff, purchased Savings Certificate 
No. 19479 in the amount of $25,000,00 from the .FIRST SECURITY 
BANK (Ex 56-P; Tr-30,31), and immediately pledged &aid certifi-
cate to the FIRST SECURITY BANK as additional security for the 
plaintiff's $50,000.00 loan which had been guaranteed by the 
defendants (Ex 24-P; Ex 23-P; Ex 68-P; Tr-161,162,258,259). 
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By March 1974, plaintiff was in default in making 
timely payments on the note of September 15, 1973, to the FIRST 
SECURITY BANK (Tr-136,261). On March 15, 1974, defendant SATHER 
paid off the existing unpaid balance of said note to the FIRST 
SECURITY BANK in the sum of $46,560.00 pursuant to defendants' 
guaranty (Ex 49-P; Tr-39,143,194,260,261; Ex 27-P). In making 
said payoff, defendant SATHER cashed in and applied the said 
Savings Certificate No. 19479 (Ex 56-P), and drew the rest of 
the money from his business accounts (Ex 58-P; Ex 68-P; Tr-261). 
After paying off said note, defendant SATHER requested 
the FIRST SECURITY BANK to deliver to him a deed dated October 11, 
1972 (ex 32-P), then being held by the FIRST SECURITY Bru~K under 
the provisions of ch8 Agreement between plaintiff and defendant 
SATHER dated September 15, 1973 (Ex 3-P). The FIRST SECURITY 
BANK, in compliance with said request, on or about Harch 15, 1974, 
delivered said Warranty Deed to defendant SATHER (Ex 27-P; 
Tr-194). 
On or about Harch 15, 1974, defendant ROBERT R. SATHER 
entered into some arrangements with James A. Sheya to borrow 
the sum of $70,000.00, which arrangements contemplated that 
defendant SATHER would deed the Hoss Ranch property to Sheya 
as security for that loan. Such a deed was recorded by defendant 
SATHER on March 25, 1974, in the office of the Uintah County 
Recorder (Ex 9-P; Ex 72-P). However, no money was ever actually 
advanced by S~eya to SATHER because it was then discovered by 
defendant SATHER before he obtained any money from Sheya that 
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plaintiff on November 2, 1973, had caused a Trust Deed to be 
recorded against the Moss Ranch ostensibly to secure a loan from 
Silvio Fassio to plaintiff for the sum of $150,000.00 (Ex 59-D; 
Tr-181,183,262,263). A deed back from Sheya to defendant SATHER 
was later recorded on May 15, 1975 (Ex 10-P; Tr-263). 
When defendant ROBERT R. SATHER discovered the said 
$150,000.00 Trust Deed on the county records in favor of Silvio 
Fassio, he requested and received from the FIRST SECURITY BANK 
an assignment of plaintiff's $50,000.00 Trust Deed dated 
September 15, 1973, which had been paid off by defendant SATHER 
on or about March 15, 1974. This Assignment was dated and 
delivered to defendant SATHER by FIRST SECURITY BANK on or about 
April 5, 1974 (ex 48-P; Tr-195,262). 
During or about the month of April 1974, plaintiff 
learned that the Deed of October 11, 1972 (Ex 32-P) had been 
delivered to the defendant SATHER by the FIRST SECURITY BANK 
(Tr-82,262). Plaintiff at that time demanded a reconveyance of 
the property, but defendant SATHER declined to do so until he 
lvas paid the sum of $46,560.00 by plaintiff, which amount is the 
sum defendant SATHER paid to the FIRST SECURITY BANK in connection 
with defendant SATHER'S guarantee of plaintiff's $50,000.00 Trust 
Deed Note (Tr-86,261,264,265). 
Plaintiff did not at any time tender any sum to 
defendant SATHER for a reconveyance of the Moss Ranch (Tr-264-266), 
although plaintiff did by letter addressed to defendant SATHER 
on September 25, 1974, acknowledge a responsibility for the sum 
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of $46,000.00 in connection with the property in que~tion 
(Ex 71-D), and plaintiff's president did testify at the trial 
that the plaintiff was willing to pay back to SATHER the 
$45,000.00 paid to the bank (Tr-108). 
Plaintiff filed suit on or about January 29, 1976, 
against defendants SATHER (R 1-17) seeking to regain the Moss 
Ranch by its paying to the defendant SATHER the amount of the 
plaintiff's Tr•JEt Deed to the FIRST SECURITY BANK (Ex 37-D), 
which had been assigned by the FIRST SECURITY BANK to defendant 
SATHER (Ex 48-P). The case was tried to a jury and was sub-
mitted to the jury upon special interrogatories (R 598-601). 
The jury found as to matters germane to the Petition for 
Rehearing tha: the plaintiff owed only the sum of $21,500.00 
to the defendant SATHER in order to regain possession of the 
Moss Ranch (R 600-601). This finding was affirmed by the 
Supreme Court upon appeal and it is in connection with this 
affirmation that the defendants seek a rehearing and further 
consideration by this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE THAT THE 
EVIDENCE REQUIRED A FINDING BY THE JURY THAT THE DEFENDANTS 
SATHER HERE ENTITLED TO BE PAID THE SUM OF $46,560.00 FROM THE 
PLAINTIFF RATHER THAN ONLY THE SUM OF $21,500.00. 
Defendants concede that in seeking a rehearing in this 
matter their burden is heavy and that a strong case must be made 
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to convince the Court that an error has been made in failing 
to reverse the jury verdict (Brown vs. Pichard, 4 Utah 292; 
11 Pacific 512). However, defendants do believe that such a 
case does exist in this matter now before the Court and they 
respectfully restate their position. 
With respect to the Moss Ranch, the real property 
involved in this action, the jury found that the plaintiff was 
the owner thereof and that the plaintiff was entitled to regain 
possession upon payment of the sum of $21,500.00 to the defend-
ants SATHER (R 600-601). Defendants SATHER contend that there 
was no credible evidence received at the trial to justify limit-
ing defendants' entitlement to $21,500.00, and that the only 
substantial evidence before the Court requires a finding that 
defendants SATHER were entitled to be awarded the sum of 
$46,560.00 as their security interest in the Moss Ranch. 
Defendants again recognize that the evidence on appeal 
after a jury verdict is to be viewed and construed most strongly 
in support of the jury's findings and that the Supreme Court 
should not change the findings of the jury where there is 
competent evidence to sustain them. (Nelson vs. Watts, 563 P2d 
798) . 
The evidence in the record of the trial cited by 
this Court to sustain and justify reducing defendant SATHER'S 
claim under the said security arrangement to $21,500.00, rather 
than the $46,560.00 actually paid by defendant SATHER on 
plaintiff's note to the FIRST SECURITY B&~K. arises from the 
circumstances whereby defendant SATHER received $25,000.00 from 
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plaintiff in the form of a check shortly after plaintiff 
received the proceeds of plaintiff's loan from the FIRST SECURITY 
BANK and whereupon defendant SATHER used said check to purchase 
a $25.000.00 savings certificate and pledged said certificate 
with the FIRST SECURITY BANK as additional security for 
plaintiff's loan. Defendant SATHER thereafter used the proceeds 
of such savings certificate toward paying off the plaintiff's 
note to FIRST SECURITY BANK after such note became delinquent. 
The Court in its decision cited the testimony of Mr. Buffo, 
president of plaintiff, wherein Mr. Buffo contended that the 
$50,000.00 loan from the bank was arranged solely for the benefit 
of SATHER so that plaintiff could loan SATHER $25,000.00 from 
the loan proceeds and thus sustained the jury's apparent reason-
ing that this being true, if SATHER used the money borrowed from 
plaintiff to pay on plaintiff's debts, it was nothing more than 
a repayment of SATHER'S debt to plaintiff to that extent. 
Mr. Buffo testified that the $25,000.00 given to 
SATHER was a loan, l·lhile SATHER testified that it was a repayment 
on a prior debt due SATHER. If this conflicting testimony were 
the only evidence in the record, and it appears from the decision 
of the Supreme Court that only this testimony was used as a 
basis for upholding the jury verdict, then defendants would 
have to concede that the jury having chosen to believe the 
testimony of Mr. Buffo, the Supreme Court ought not to substitute 
their judgment for that of the jury even if the Court disagreed 
with the jury. However, defendant believes that additional 
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evidence in the record, furnished by the plaintiff itself, 
eliminates any real conflict in the evidence on the point 
herein under consideration and compells a finding in support 
of defendants' position that defendant used his money to pay 
off plaintiff's loan in the amount of $46,560.00. Contrary to 
the testimony of Mr. Buffo at the trial, the plaintiff, through 
Mr. Buffo, did as late as September 25, 1974, acknowledge a 
debt of $46,000.00 to defendant SATHER in connection with the 
property in question (Ex 71-D). This exhibit, a letter from 
Mr. Buffo to Mr. Sather, reads as follows: 
"September 25, 1974 
"Mr. Bob Sather 
P. 0. Box 608 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Dear Bob: 
"In reply to your message of September 14, 1974, which 
you mailed on the 19th, as you know, if payments are 
to be made to Mr. Sheya, I am only responsible for a 
total amount of $46,000 or a $23,000 payment. As I 
told you Friday, I am making arrangements to try to 
pay off my entire payments of $46,000 which I have a 
commitment for. Actually, both as myself and the 
Fassios have told you, the second is not a phony and 
is not to be regarded as one. 
"I will notify you as to my closing date to pay Mr. 
Sheya off. If not, I suggest the two of us go see 
Mr. Sheya together. The Fassios are also too good 
of friends for me to "screw around with" so let's sit 
down and get this taken care of in a proper manner. 
"Sincerely yours, 
s/ Pete Buffo 
Pete J. Buffo 
President" 
While the exhibit does indicate that payment by 
plaintiff will be made to a Hr. Sheya, the admission of liability 
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was made at a time when plaintiff believed defendant SATHER 
had actually borrowed money on the property from Mr. Sheya and 
given the property in question as security (Tr 83-84). Although 
SATHER did attempt to borrow money from Sheya and to use the 
property as security, he was never able to do so because plaintiff 
had previously encumbered the property with a $150,000.00 Trust 
Deed to Mr. Fassio (Tr 262-263). 
It is obvious that in September 1974 plaintiff 
recognized a liability and debt for essentially the amount of 
money ($46,560.00) SATHER had paid the bank to discharge plain-
tiff's loan from the bank, which loan had been guaranteed by 
SATHER. The admission was made at a time when no lawsuit was 
pending and when the circumstances of the arrangement between 
the parties were doubtless considerably more fresh in the mind 
of Mr. Buffo than at the time of the trial, more than four years 
later. Attention is also directed to the fact that plaintiff did 
not offer any evidence to rebut defendant's Exhibit #71 after 
its admission without objection (Tr 266). A fair interpretation 
of defendant's Exhibit #71 does not disclose a mere offer to 
compromise, but is a clear acknowledgment of a debt owing by 
plaintiff in consideration of SATHER'S payment of plaintiff's 
loan from the FIRST SECURITY BANK. 
Defendants respectfully submit that the jury and the 
Supreme Court on appeal overlooked or ignored evidence, which 
if properly considered would make the finding of the jury in 
the respect under consideration untenable. Defendant's Exhibit 
-12-
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#7lis avoluntary admission of liability by plaintiff that it 
owed at least $46,000.00 in connection with the reacquisition 
of the property in question and it was made at a time when 
plaintiff was not under the circumstances of trying to sustain 
a contradictory position during the course of the trial. 
Plaintiff's failure to in any way repudiate such admission after 
the introduction of defendant's Exhibit #71 into evidence 
constitutes the strongest kind of evidence against the plaintiff's 
contention that the $25,000.00 was merely a loan to defendant 
SATHER rather than repayment on a pre-existing debt. (Volume 2, 
Jones on Evidence, page 738, Fifth Edition). The situation is 
similar to that where a party's testimony is deliberately self-
contradictory, in which case the Trier of Fact is justified in 
considering that party's position from the version of the 
evidence which is least favorable to him. (Wilson vs. Blair, 
211 P. 289; 65 Montana 155). 
Defendants respectfully submit that the present case 
is one in which the Court should exercise its inherent super-
visory powers to administer justice and determine that because 
of the evidence before the Court, defendants' basic entitlement 
from the plaintiff is the sum of $46,560.00, rather than the 
sum of $21,500.00 as found by the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
The verdict of the jury with respect to its finding 
that the defendants SATHER are only entitled to reimbursement 
from the plaintiff for the sum of $21,500.00 of the $46,560.00 
-13-
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paid by the defendants on plaintiff's past due Trust Deed 
Note, guaranteed by the defendants, is not supported by 
competent or substantial evidence in view of plaintiff's own 
admission and evidence to the contrary. Rehearing on this point 
would be in the interests of justice and within the prerogatives 
of this Court. 
In any event, should this Court decline to grant the 
affirmative relief sought herein by the defendants SATHER, the 
defendants SATHER should be granted a new trial on the issue 
and point herein raised. 
Respectfully submitted, 
or 
EN, TAYLOR & MOODY 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Appellants 
55 East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84601 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Two copies of the foregoing were mailed, postage 
prepaid, to McRae & Deland, attorneys for plaintiff and 
respondent, 317 West 1st South Street, Vernal, Utah 84078, 
this 1/~ day of January, 1980. 
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